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    I.  Introduction 
 
 
 Culpable participation in another actor’s wrongful conduct is an independent basis for 
liability, that of an accessory. Much about this contingent form of liability is open to dispute, 
including the operative definition of participation and other elements requisite to establishing 
liability, as well as whether criteria for liability should operate uniformly regardless of the field 
of substantive law that defines the primary wrong. Moreover, a primary wrongdoer’s liability 
may be grounded in a type or degree of culpability that does not match the accessory’s, leading 
to outcomes that may seem asymmetrical. To illuminate these questions and their consequences, 
this paper draws contrasts between the law in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
focusing on accessory liability when the primary wrong constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. 
 In both jurisdictions, accessory liability is controversial but for reasons distinctive to 
each. In the United States, well-established general doctrine defines the elements requisite to 
establishing accessory liability, whether stemming from breach of fiduciary duty or another 
                                                 
*David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. For comments on 
earlier drafts, I thank Jo Braithwaite, as well as Paul Davies, Richard Nolan, and the other 
participants in the conference on Equity, Trusts and Commerce (National University Singapore 
& Oxford University April 2016).  
 




wrongful act.1 What prompts controversy is how the doctrine applies to categories of actors, 
most recently investment bankers who advise boards of target companies in merger-and-
acquisition (‘M&A’) transactions. When the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a $75.8 million 
judgment against an investment bank as an accessory to a board’s breach of fiduciary duty,2 
accessory liability drew new interest from M&A lawyers and their clients. Although much 
attention focused on the bank’s evident conflicts of interest in acting as an  advisor to the target 
board, the court’s analysis of the bank’s liability additionally stressed the elements requisite to 
liability, which in the United States sounds in tort. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, accessory 
liability in connection with breach of trust or fiduciary duty is controversial because the law is 
less clear, in part as a consequence of significant shifts in doctrinal basics within a relatively 
short period of time. Additionally, private law in the United Kingdom particularizes accessory 
liability, defining its requisites differently depending on the nature of the primary wrong. 
 The paper’s central claim is that in both jurisdictions, how the law categorizes a wrong 
matters for the elements of accessory liability. That is, breaching a fiduciary duty and culpably 
assisting a fiduciary’s breach are both instances of wrongful conduct. Characterizing both as 
tortious, as does US law, has consequences for the elements of accessory liability. In contrast,  
within UK law, equity houses both wrongs, while the requisites for accessory liability in 
connection with a tort are very different. The contrast suggests that fundamental taxonomic 
choices about doctrinal organization can be consequential for doctrinal substance. Additionally, 
understood more functionally, accessory liability for breaches of fiduciary duty can operate 
                                                 
1Tortious interference with a contract has long been treated separately and is outside the 
scope of this paper. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766-767 (1979)(improper interference 
with contract; impropriety assessed through seven-factor test).  
2RBC Capital Markets, LLC v Jervis 129 A 3d 816 (Del 2015). 
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interstitially to complement and supplement liability based on the primary wrong. Difficult 
though it would be to establish empirically, situating accessory liability in tort may facilitate its 
interstitial operation.    
 Section II introduces the doctrinal basics for the United States that specify when an 
actor’s liability is contingent on another actor’s breach of fiduciary duty. Section II also 
introduces the significance of factors distinct from private law that can shape the conduct of 
primary actors and those who advise or assist them, including formal regulation and extra-legal 
constraints. Against this background, Section III draws contrasts with UK law, surveying 
doctrinal legacies as well as more recent shifts in doctrine. Section IV focuses on recent 
applications of accessory liability to investment bankers in high-stakes M&A litigation in 
Delaware courts. Section V concludes. An introductory word about terminology is warranted. 
Throughout, the paper uses terminology that is consistent with the independent nature of 
accessory liability. This status is undercut when accessory liability is termed ‘secondary’,3 
‘derivative’, or ‘parasitic’.4 Thus, although the paper uses the term ‘primary’ wrong, its overall 
terminology presupposes that an accessory’s liability, albeit contingent, stems from the 
accessory’s own wrongful conduct. Additionally, in no way is accessory liability an instance of 
vicarious liability, through which the law charges one actor with the legal consequences of 
another actor’s conduct on the basis of the relationship between them.5 Accessory liability is not 
                                                 
3P Davies, Accessory Liability (Oxford & Portland, Hart Publishing, 2015) 54 (‘the 
language of ‘secondary liability’ might ... suggest that an accessory is secondarily liable for the 
same wrong as the primary wrongdoer’.); J Dietrich & P Ridge, Accessories in Private Law 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015) 7-8 (‘secondary liability’ misleading if 
understood to mean accessory must be liable for same wrong as primary wrongdoer and subject 
to same remedies).  
4Davies, above n3 at 54 (‘the parasitic nature of accessory liability is crucial’). 
5The quintessential example is the vicarious liability of an employer or other principal for 
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an offshoot of agency doctrine but an instance of wrongful conduct that directly subjects an actor 
to liability.   
        II.     United States: Basic Doctrine  
A. Accessory Liability and Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
 In the United States, private law has long situated within tort the liabilities that stem from 
breach of fiduciary duty as well as accessory liability for participating in a fiduciary’s breach. As 
stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an actor who stands ‘in a fiduciary relation with 
another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the 
relation’.6  The commentary to the Restatement recognizes that a tort claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty may supplement other remedies available to a plaintiff that do not require showing 
harm.7 The section’s remedial focus anchors the availability of compensatory damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty but does not define the circumstances under which such a duty arises.8 
For this task other law—agency, trusts, corporate law and the like—supplies the substance. 
Indeed, an action in tort is often not a plaintiff’s first resort in response to a breach of fiduciary 
duty. In some settings, non-tort remedies are exclusive, as when a trustee breaches a duty to a 
trust beneficiary. While the standard remedy—an equitable surcharge to restore trust assets—can 
resemble the monetary outcome of a tort claim, the procedure that leads to the exclusive remedy 
                                                                                                                                                             
torts committed by a servant or other agent. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.03 (2)(2006). 
When the principal’s own fault subjects the principal to liability, the liability is direct, not 
vicarious. See ibid cmt b. 
6Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 (1979). The original Restatement of Torts contained 
a verbatim formulation. See Restatement of Torts § 874 (1939). 
7ibid cmt b.  
8For further discussion, see DA DeMott, ‘Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable 
Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences’ (2006) 48 Arizona Law Review 925-934. 
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is equitable in character.9 This eliminates the prospect of jury trial, which is a procedural 
backdrop to US tort litigation that arguably shapes tort doctrine in various ways.10    
 Likewise, tort law has long encompassed accessory liability for participation in a 
fiduciary’s breach of duty. As detailed further in Section IV, this is so even in Delaware. 
Although law and equity have not been merged in Delaware, and equity jurisdiction resides in a 
separate court (the Court of Chancery, in which there are no jury trials), tort doctrine shapes 
significant aspects of fiduciary litigation. Moreover, across US jurisdictions, with the exception 
of tortious interference with contract,11 the authoritative formulation of accessory liability is 
trans-substantive, that is, applicable across the board regardless of the nature of the primary 
wrong.12 Some courts quote all or part of the relevant formulation in Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 876 13 as if it constituted primary statutory authority, not just persuasive secondary 
authority:  
                                                 
9Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 95 (2012). 
10On the tort claim in settings without specialized remedies, see Kann v Kann, 690 A 2d 
509 (Md 1997); Bank One, NA v Borse, 812 NE 2d 1021 (Ill App 2004). On the civil jury’s 
significance for tort doctrine, see MD Green, ‘The Impact of the Civil Jury on American Tort 
Law’ (2011) 38 Pepperdine L Rev 337, 340-345. 
11See above n 1.   
12In federal criminal law, the statutory formulation is also trans-substantive. A general 
statute provides that all actors who knowingly provide aid to persons committing federal crimes, 
with the intent of facilitating the crime, themselves commit a crime. See Act of Mar 4, 1909, ch 
321, 35 Stat 1088, 1152, codified as 18 United States Code § 2.  
13Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (1979). The first Restatement of Torts did not 
include tortious action in concert or pursuant to a common design, as stated in § 876 
(a)(Restatement (Second). Instead, the first subsection subjected to liability an actor who ‘orders 
or induces such [tortious] conduct, knowing that the conditions under which the act is done or 
intending the consequences which ensue’. Restatement of Torts § 876 (a)(1939). More 
contemporary formulations relocate many instances of ‘ordering’ another’s tortious act to agency 
law. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.03(1)(a) (2006) (principal subject to direct liability 
when agent acts with actual authority and agent’s conduct is tortious). Inducing another actor’s 
tortious conduct constitutes intentional action by the inducer. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 1 (2010). 
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      For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is 
     subject to liability if he 
 
   (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a 
common design with him, or 
 
    (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty 
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to 
conduct himself, or 
 
    (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a 
tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, 
constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. 
  
Although this section is entitled “Persons Acting in Concert,” only subsection (a) addresses 
conduct pursuant to a common design or otherwise in concert.14 On equal footing is subsection 
(b), applicable to conduct that ‘gives substantial assistance or encouragement’ to another actor 
whose conduct is known to constitute a breach of duty. One who gives such assistance or 
encouragement is often termed an aider and abettor to the primary wrongdoer. Aiding-and-
abetting liability is premised, not on an agreement with the primary wrongdoer, but on giving 
assistance, knowing of the primary wrongdoer’s breach of duty.15  
 Claims based on aiding-and-abetting theories of liability are often asserted when the 
primary wrongdoer is insolvent and is alleged to have engaged in tortious conduct in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
   
14See Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal App 3d 119, 214 Cal Rptr 177 (1985)(accessory 
defendants who purchased shares in target corporation agreed with directors to drop challenge to 
defensive acquisition in exchange for corporation’s commitment to repurchase shares at above-
market price, enabling target’s directors to retain control; if directors breached fiduciary duty to 
corporation, accessory defendants subject to liability on the basis of action pursuant to common 
plan or design to commit a tort).  
15RC Mason, ‘Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting’ (2006) 61 Business Lawyer 1135, 
1138. But see Heckmann, 127 Cal App 3d at 127, 214 Cal Rptr at 183-84 (characterizing acting 




commercial setting.16 A large majority of jurisdictions in the United States accept the premise of 
subsection (b) in some context, most typically when the primary wrong alleged is fraud or breach 
of fiduciary duty.17 However, in 1994, the Supreme Court held in Central Bank of Denver, NA v 
First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA18 that the general prohibition on fraud in the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 did not create or support a private cause of action based on aiding and 
abetting. Following Central Bank, the private-law liability of actors who facilitate federal 
securities fraud must be premised on violations of state securities statutes or common-law 
principles of accessory liability. Those principles, as stated above, operate generally, whether the 
primary wrong is fraud or breach of fiduciary duty.19    
 And now to return to questions of terminology. Section I characterized accessory liability 
as ‘contingent’. Within tort doctrine, accessory liability is not a unique instance of contingent 
liability. For example, an actor who makes a material misrepresentation of fact, opinion, or law 
acts fraudulently when the maker knows that the representation is false.20 But the maker is not 
subject to liability for the common-law tort of fraud unless the misstatement is made to induce 
another to act or refrain from acting.21 Additionally, when the maker intends to mislead, the 
maker is not subject to liability unless the person to whom the misrepresentation was made 
                                                 
16ibid at 1135. 
17ibid at 1139-40. Accessory liability claims against lawyers may be subject to the 
assertion of privilege so long as the lawyer’s action was on the client’s behalf and within the 
scope of the attorney-client relationship. See HS Bryans, ‘Claims Against Lawyers by 
Bankruptcy Trustees—A First Course on the In Pari Delicto Doctrine’ (2011) 66 Business 
Lawyer 587, 594 n 52.  
18Central Bank of Denver, NA v First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA, 511 US 164 (1994). 
19Although most aiding-and-abetting claims concern fraud, ‘breaches of fiduciary duty 
are close behind’. Mason, above n 15 at 1159. 
20Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 10 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2014). 
21ibid §§ 9 & 11. 
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suffers economic loss caused by justifiable reliance on the misstatement.22 Thus, one who 
knowingly makes a material misrepresentation of fact may meaningfully be said to act 
fraudulently,23 but whether the actor is subject to liability for the tort of common-law fraud is 
contingent on the presence of additional elements that define the tort.24 Accessory liability, 
likewise, is contingent on the presence of several distinct elements defining the wrong. One, of 
course, is the occurrence of a primary wrong. Thus, private-law accessory liability, while not 
inchoate,25 is nonetheless contingent.   
B. Elements of Claim 
 Based on the reported cases, accessory liability claims in connection with breaches of 
fiduciary duty fall into clusters defined by typical types of defendants. Lawyers, directors and 
                                                 
22ibid. On the significance of reliance as a distinct element, see Rosen v. Spanierman, 894 
F 2d 28 (2d Cir 1990); JCP Goldberg, AJ Sebok & BC Zipursky, ‘The Place of Reliance in 
Fraud’ (2006) 48 Arizona Law Review 1001-1026. A plaintiff may premise a claim on third-party 
reliance when misrepresentations are and are intended to be communicated to the plaintiff 
through a third party and thereby relied upon to the plaintiff’s detriment. See Mid Atlantic 
Framing, LLC v Varish Construction, Inc., 117 F Supp 3d 145, 153 (SDNY 2015)(applying New 
York law). 
23This is especially so when through the misrepresentation some other wrong is 
perpetrated. See Goldberg et al, above n 22 at 1003. Relatedly, an actor who drives a car at high 
speed on a city street may meaningfully be said to act negligently, although no one (or thing) is 
hit. For the classic statement, see Palsgraf v Long Island R Co, 248 NY 339, 349 (1928)(‘Should 
we drive down Broadway at a reckless speed, we are negligent whether we strike an approaching 
car or miss it by an inch’.)(Andrews J dissenting). Under contemporary tort law, if the driver of 
the approaching car or her passenger suffers severe emotional harm resulting from the perception 
of imminent bodily harm from what appears to be an imminent collision, the harm may be 
compensable. See Restatement (Third) of Torts § 47(a) cmt e, Illus 2 (elaborating on ‘zone of 
danger’ principle).  
24One might say the presence of these elements completes the tort; for Professor 
Goldberg and his co-authors, that reliance is essential to the definition of common-law fraud 
underscores the tort’s relational quality. Goldberg et al, above n 22 at 1026. 
25Davies, above n 3 at 32. In criminal law, in contrast, inchoate liability is distinct from 





officers, and financial intermediaries of various sorts are frequent defendants, as they are in cases 
in which fraud constitutes the alleged primary wrong. An accessory claim requires that the 
plaintiff allege: (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) a breach of duty by the fiduciary; 
(3) the accessory defendant’s knowing participation in the breach; and (4) damages to the 
plaintiff as a result of the accessory defendant’s participation and the fiduciary’s breach. Thus, an 
aiding-and-abetting claim necessarily fails when no fiduciary relationship exists26 or when no 
one has breached a fiduciary duty.27  
 Some cases restrict the availability of aiding-and-abetting claims to defendants who are 
not themselves fiduciaries.28 But if an aiding-and-abetting claim fails against a defendant on this 
basis, the defendant’s conduct might well have breached a fiduciary duty it owed to the plaintiff. 
In Calesa Associates, L.P. v. American Capital, Ltd. 29, a recent Delaware case, minority 
shareholders alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the corporation’s dilutive 
issuance of new equity. The plaintiffs alleged that a substantial shareholder, a private equity 
firm, coerced members of the corporation’s board of directors into authorizing the issuance, 
which redounded to the private equity firm’s distinct benefit. The court held that the minority 
                                                 
26For a recent example, see Rocky Mountain Exploration, Inc. v Davis Graham & Stubbs 
LLP, 2016 WL 908640 (Colo Ct App 2016). In Rocky Mountain, a law firm represented an entity 
in connection with its purchase of oil and gas interests owned by the plaintiff. The purchasing 
entity acted as an unidentified principal represented by an agent, also represented by the law 
firm. The court held that the agreements between the plaintiff and unidentified principal’s agent 
did not create a fiduciary relationship. Thus the plaintiff’s aiding-and-abetting claim against the 
law firm ‘necessarily fails’. ibid *7.  
27See discussion above accompanying n 25 of inchoate liability. 
28See Metro Life Insurance Co v Tremont Group Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL 6632681 *18 
(Del Ch Dec. 20, 2012). The Delaware Supreme Court’s own statements of the elements of the 
claim do not include this qualification. See Malpiede v Towson, 780 A2d 1075, 1098 (Del 2001). 





shareholders’ aiding-and-abetting claim against the private equity firm would fail were the court 
to find that the firm was a controlling stockholder at the time of the transaction because that 
status would, under Delaware law, itself impose fiduciary duties on the private equity firm owed 
to the other shareholders.30 But, in the alternative, as a non-fiduciary, if the private equity firm 
aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty committed by the company’s directors, it would be 
subject to liability.31 More generally, the alternative claims elaborated in Calesa underscore the 
independent nature of accessory liability for breach of fiduciary duty. Albeit dependent on the 
commission of a primary wrong, the accessory claim does not duplicate its elements.32 
 Consistent with Restatement (Second) section 876(b), an accessory’s liability requires 
that the accessory know of the fiduciary’s breach of duty. Most courts define “knowledge” to 
mean actual knowledge of the fiduciary relationship and the breach,33 rejecting a standard of 
constructive knowledge that charges a defendant with such knowledge as would have been 
obtained through the exercise of reasonable care.34 Conscious avoidance—suspecting a fact, 
realizing its probability, and refraining from confirming the fact—implies a culpable state of 
mind, as opposed to the imputed state of mind that follows constructive knowledge on a 
                                                 
30The criterion is whether the shareholder owns a majority interest in the corporation or 
exercises control over its business affairs. Kahn v Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 638 A2d 
1110, 1113 (Del 1994). The Delaware corporation statute does not include oppression remedies; 
Delaware’s functional alternative to a statutory oppression remedy to protect minority equity 
investors is the imposition of fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders. 
31See also Carsonaro v.Bloodhound Technologies, Inc., 65 A3d 618, 658 (Del Ch 2013). 
32For a rare example to the contrary that characterizes aiding-and-abetting liability as 
superfluous and duplicative of elements of primary wrong, see Sompo Japan Insurance, Inc v 
Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 2005 WL 1412741 (NC Superior Ct June 10, 2005), discussed in 
Mason, above n 15 at 1163. 
33Mason, above n 15 at 1160. 
34Invest Almaz v Temple Inland Forest Products Corp, 243 F.3d 57, 83 (1st Cir 2001). 
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negligence theory.35 Regardless of the applicable standard, the analytic focus is the accessory’s 
knowledge of the fiduciary relationship and its breach. Participation in the fiduciary’s breach 
with knowledge of the fiduciary relationship and the breach establishes the accessory’s 
culpability. These requisites have consequences for how the tort is characterized for some 
purposes under US law, including claims for contribution, discussed in Section IV.  
      Conduct through which an actor participates in a primary wrong is susceptible to 
further parsing. ‘Substantial assistance or encouragement’, as in the Restatement formulation, 
may imply that accessory liability cannot stem from conduct that induces or otherwise initiates 
another actor’s breach of duty. In Christopher Kutz’s terminology, accessories are by definition 
never the exclusive authors of harm to the plaintiff; instead, accessories would always be 
inclusive authors of harm-producing actions in which they culpably participate.36 But knowingly 
to induce a breach of fiduciary duty is a significant basis for accessory liability, as is evident in 
Section IV; one might view inducement as a form of ‘encouragement’ of an initiatory, not a tag-
along sort, constituting both exclusive and inclusive authorship. However styled, an accessory’s 
participation in a fiduciary’s breach of duty is not a basis for liability unless it is connected to 
harm suffered by the plaintiff. The Restatement formulation requires that the assistance or 
encouragement have been ‘substantial’, that is, ‘a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort’, 
which excludes minimal or slight conduct.37  
 More generally, as prior scholarship recognizes, conventional but-for tests of causal 
                                                 
35Fraternity Fund Ltd v Beacon Hill Asset Management, LLC, 479 F Supp 2d 349, 368 
(SDNY 2007). Some Delaware cases formulate the standard to encompass constructive 
knowledge as an alternative to actual knowledge but also require that the aider and abettor have 
acted with scienter. See Section IV.  
36C Kutz, Complicity 105-106 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
37Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt d. 
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connection do not work well when a series of multiple autonomous actors each engages in 
distinct conduct that results in an indivisible injury to a third party.38 Positing, as did HLA Hart 
and Tony Honoré, a special form of causality for interpersonal situations, does not generate a 
causally-framed test for liability.39 An alternative, championed by Michael Moore, recognizes 
that harms may have co-causes and treats causation itself as a ‘primitive’, a ‘factor’ with a scalar 
quality that does not operate in binary fashion.40 As Paul Davies proposes, it may be best to 
focus on participatory linkages through which an actor made more than a minimal contribution to 
the primary wrong.41 More descriptively, one might acknowledge that situations in which 
multiple autonomous actors choose in various ways to contribute to a primary wrong are not the 
prototypes assumed by conventional formulations of causation.     
 Accessory liability requires culpable participation in the primary wrongdoer’s breach of 
fiduciary duty. This requisite calls into question whether accessory liability might be premised 
on failure to act when the accessory knows that the primary culprit is engaged in wrongdoing but 
remains silent, resulting in loss for the plaintiff. Framing accessory liability within tort law 
makes salient a bedrock principle of common-law tort: the absence of a duty to rescue when an 
actor has not created or increased the risk of harm and is outside the ambit of relationships in 
which such a duty is implied.42  To be sure, typical illustrations of the bite of the no-duty-to-
rescue principle involve actors who know that they could easily save others from physical harm 
at no jeopardy to themselves. But the principle operates more generally as a justification for non-
                                                 
38Davies, above n 3 at 33-40; Kutz, above n 36 at 169-170. 
39Kutz, above n 36 at 170; see HLA Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd edn  
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985) 388. 
40Moore, above n 25 at 300.  
41Davies, above n 3 at 40. 
42Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 40, cmt f. 
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intervention, just as duty serves as a central organizing concept across tort law.43  
 Thus, banks and comparable institutions generally owe non-customers no duty to protect 
them from fraud perpetrated by bank customers.44 However, once a bank has ‘clear evidence’ 
that trust funds on deposit in a fiduciary account have been misappropriated, the bank breaches 
its duty to safeguard the funds if it fails to investigate.45 But a bank owes a duty to safeguard 
trust funds on deposit with it. The bank breaches its implied duty to prevent diversion through a 
passive failure to make reasonable inquiry once aware that improprieties may be occurring. In 
contrast, when a bank owes no duty to a plaintiff, the bank is not subject to liability when it fails 
to inform the plaintiff that a customer may be engaged in fraud.46  
 One practical generalization is that substantial assistance may be easier to establish when  
the primary wrong is breach of fiduciary duty than when it is fraud. This may be due to ‘the 
higher level of duty owed by the fiduciary’, which may make more apparent the connection 
between the accessory’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.47 Alternatively, an accessory who 
knows that the primary wrongdoer is tied to the plaintiff by a fiduciary relationship may seem 
more readily to join in as a co-author of harm to the plaintiff than accessories who become aware 
of another actor’s fraud.                  
C. Regulation and Environmental Circumstances 
 Private law doctrines do not operate in isolation as constraints against wrongful conduct, 
including breaches of fiduciary duty and conduct that knowingly assists such breaches. In some 
                                                 
43 For the same principle, see Fitzalan-Howard v. Hibbert [2009] EWHC 2855 [44].  
44MLSMK Investment Co v. JP Morgan Chase & Co, 431 Fed Appx 17, 20 (2d Cir 2011);  
Tamar Frankel, The Ponzi Scheme Puzzle (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012) 180.  
45Lerner v. Fleet Bank , NA, 459 F 3d 273, 295 (2d Cir. 2006). 
46In re Sharp International Corp, 403 F 3d 43, 52 n 2 (2d Cir 2005).  
47Mason, above n 15 at 1163-1164. 
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settings, the general law may operate to supplement requirements imposed by statutes and 
regulation. For example, broker-dealer firms that operate as clearing firms provide essential 
clearing services for accounts, including trading, settlement, and delivery of securities. Clearing 
firms typically have no customer contact for accounts for which they perform these services. But 
regulation requires that clearing firms monitor accounts for illegal activity, including violations 
of trading and anti-money laundering rules.48 Regulation positions such firms—which are few in 
number—as gatekeepers on behalf of investors and market integrity more broadly, distinct from 
the firms’ relationships with their direct clients. Likewise, when a firm operates as a prime 
broker and learns that a hedge-fund client has overvalued investment portfolios, the prime 
broker’s regulatory responsibilities include reporting the situation to the SEC.49 In contrast, 
investment banks that serve as M&A advisors—the focus of Section IV—are not positioned by 
regulation as gatekeepers comparable to the financial institutions discussed above. Nor does 
industry self-regulation define responsibilities for M&A advisors or sanction departures from 
defined responsibilities,50 comparable to the ethical rules and professional disciplinary systems 
applicable to lawyers.51 As a consequence, the significance of general legal doctrine and its 
enforcement may be amplified when specialized regulation does not constrain harmful conduct.52       
                                                 
48Re Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, LP f/k/a Spear, Leeds & Kellogg. LP, 
Securities Exchange Act Release No 55,465 (March 14, 2007). 
49For an example, see Fraternity Fund Ltd, 479 F Supp 2d at 357 (prime broker 
precipitated collapse of fraudulent investment scheme when it refused to provide additional 
financing and reported over-valued investment portfolios to SEC). 
50See generally AF Tuch, ‘The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers’ (2014) 83 George 
Washington L Rev 101.  
51 On debates concerning the adequacy of constraints on lawyers’ conduct in financial 
transactions, see D Howarth, Law as Engineering (Cheltenham & Northhampton, Edward Elgar, 
2013) 97-140 ; D Kershaw & R Moorhead, ‘Consequential Responsibility for Client Wrongs: 
Lehman Brothers and the Regulation of the Legal Profession’ (2013) 76 MLR 26. 
52 Admittedly, the interplay between courts and legislatures in this connection is complex, 
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 Beyond the law and formal regulation as well as structured self-regulation, wrongful 
conduct may be constrained by an actor’s concern to establish and maintain a good reputation. 
It’s open to question whether reputational constraints now operate more weakly than in the past 
in some environments, including those populated by financial firms and professional-services 
firms.53 However, intense journalistic scrutiny may enhance what might otherwise seem weak 
incentives to avoid problematic conduct, in this context conduct that enters or closely skirts the 
boundaries of accessory liability. As Section IV explores in greater detail, conflicted investment 
banks that serve as M&A advisors are potentially subject to accessory liability through conduct 
that places directors in jeopardy of breaching their fiduciary duties. These widely reported risks 
triggered quantifiable changes in how target boards choose their advisors. That many more 
targets now choose advisors free of potentially conflicting lines of business suggests the power 
of accessory liability to amplify the force of other constraints on conduct by inducing greater 
care in selecting an advisor.54  
 The advice lawyers give their clients can also strengthen incentives to steer away from 
legally problematic conduct. When legal doctrine is unclear or the consequences of breach 
uncertain, counsel may be less resolute or categorical in advising clients. The reported reaction 
of English counsel is instructive. During a period recounted in Section III, accessory liability for 
breach of trust turned on whether the accessory acted with a dishonest state of mind, not just on 
                                                                                                                                                             
requiring close attention to the prototypical actor assumed by general legal principles. See S 
Gardner, ‘Knowing assistance and knowing receipt: taking stock’ (1996) 112 LQR 56, 78-
84(distinguishing situation of ‘ordinary traders’ from professional agents).   
53See J Macey, The Death of Corporate Reputation (Upper Saddle River, FT Press, 
2013).  
54L Hoffman, ‘Firms Ask: Are Our Bankers Conflicted’ Wall Street Journal, March 3, 
2016)(reporting rise to 19% of M&A advisory revenue earned in 2015 by “boutique” advisory 
firms that specialize in advisory services, up from 8% in 2008). For a broader account, see WW 
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whether the accessory was dishonest (or acted with knowledge of the trustee’s breach of duty, as 
US law formulates the counterpart of this element of liability). The Law Lord who dissented 
from this turn in doctrine explained extra-judicially: ‘As the majority left it, the law was 
incoherent. The profession recognized this, and many members of the Bar whose opinions I 
respected told me that they were dismayed by the decision which they considered made it 
difficult to make directors and other liable when they behaved dishonestly’.55 Later 
developments arguably shifted the law to conform to the dissenter’s view, as discussed in 
Section III. For present purposes, the point is that how lawyers understand legal doctrine and 
how they advise their clients are crucial to mechanisms of translation and transmission.56  
.      
         III. The United Kingdom 
A. Doctrinal Structure 
 To some readers, the generality of so much private-law accessory doctrine in the United 
States may come as a surprise. For in the United Kingdom, just as tort and equity occupy distinct 
precincts in the overall taxonomy of private law, accessory liability is not generalized, and the 
substantive requisites for accessory liability differ based on the nature of the primary wrong. It 
may seem counterintuitive that generality and relative doctrinal certainty characterize the United 
States, a jurisdiction organized with multiple sovereign states that is also known for relatively 
high levels of litigation between private parties and jury trials in civil cases. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bratton & ML Wachter, ‘Bankers and Chancellors’ (2014) 93 Texas L Rev 1.  
55P Millett, As In Memory Long (London, Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing, 2015)        
176-77.  
56Such anecdotes suggest that formally-structured dialog between court and counsel do 
not exhaust the possibilities for exchanges that may prove influential. On forms of judicial dialog 
specific to the House of Lords and the UK Supreme Court, see A Paterson, Final Judgment 
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 Two institutional factors concerning the United States are necessary preludes to further 
discussion of the United Kingdom. First, Delaware’s Court of Chancery is the most prominent 
court in articulating and applying doctrines that define accessory liability for breach of fiduciary 
duty, at least in high-profile disputes grounded in corporate law. But as the court’s name 
suggests, it is—distinctively if not uniquely in the United States—a court of equity. As Section 
IV elaborates, Delaware situates accessory liability in tort; indeed the court characterizes breach 
of fiduciary duty  as an ‘equitable tort’57 and readily accommodates accessory liability within a 
framework structured within tort doctrine. Second, although the United States is a large and 
remarkably varied country in which basic areas of private law are within the province of each 
state, centripetal or centralizing forces operate as well. To be sure, unlike Canada, the United 
States has no national- level corporations legislation, but in practice many publicly-held 
corporations are incorporated in Delaware. De facto Delaware’s corporation statute, plus the 
Court of Chancery and Supreme Court, all operate on a national plane. Additionally, over the 
twentieth century, courts in some states influenced sister states’ courts, while the Restatements 
served to make decisional law more uniform, albeit not evenly so on all points within private 
law.58    
                                                                                                                                                             
(Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2013). 
57In re Rural/Metro Corp Stockholders Litigation, 88 A 3d 54, 98 (Del Ch 2014), affd sub 
nom RBC Capital Markets v Jervis, 129 A3d 816 (Del 2015)(‘a breach of fiduciary duty is an 
equitable tort’)(‘Rural/Metro I’). As the author of Rural/Metro I wrote extra-judicially, ‘a breach 
of fiduciary duty is in fact a tort, although a unique species historically called an ‘equitable 
tort’‘). JT Laster & MD Morris, ‘Breaches of Fiduciary Duty and the Delaware Uniform 
Contribution Act’ (2010) Delaware Law Review 71, 71. UK courts apply the term ‘equitable tort’ 
to characterize dishonest assistance (e.g. bribery) to induce or assist a breach of fiduciary duty. 
See P Davies, ‘Gain-Based Remedies for Dishonest Assistance’ (2015) 131 LQR 173, 176. 
58Likewise, the Uniform Commercial Code was a major force toward greater uniformity 
in contract law, even for portions not encompassed by the Code. See E A Farnsworth, Contracts, 
4th edn (New York, Aspen, 2004) 40, 298-299, 596. 
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B.  Legacies and Evolution 
i. Tort  
 As Paul Davies recounts the situation, accessory liability in tort, now subsumed into 
‘joint tortfeasance’, is somewhat obscure and dominated by concepts of conspiracy.59 No doubt 
history beyond the scope of this paper explains much. In general, the conduct requisite to 
accessory liability consists of combination, authorisation, or procurement.60 Absent a common 
design, an actor who furnishes substantial assistance to another actor’s tort is not subject to 
accessory liability.61 When fraud is the primary or underlying wrong, the reasoning in prominent 
judgments excludes the possibility of imposing liability on an actor who assisted the primary 
fraudfeasor but was not party to a common design.62 
 One potential justification for defining accessory liability so narrowly is fear lest the 
requisite that assistance be ‘knowing’ be weakened by pressures to demand less than actual 
knowledge of the primary wrong.63 The US experience suggests that judicial vigilance is 
necessary but achievable. That civil juries significantly feature in US tort cases (but not in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery) may help explain this stringency. Additionally, if the policy 
justifications for a narrow definition of accessory liability presuppose, as a prototypical tort, 
                                                 
59Davies, above n 3 at 178-79. The UK Supreme Court expressly adopted the 
terminology of accessory liability in tort in Fish & Fish Ltd v. Sea Shepherd [2015] AC 1229. 
60ibid at 188, adopting formulation in H Carty, ‘Joint Tortfeasance and Assistance 
Liability’ (1999) 19 Legal Studies 489. 
61Davies, above n 3 at 195. See also P Davies, ‘Accessory Liability in Tort’ (2016) 132 
LQR 15. In general, accessory liability requires that an actor have assisted the commission of an 
act by the primary wrongdoer, that the assistance be pursuant to a common design, and that the 
primary wrongdoer’s act constitute a tort as against the claimant. Fish & Fish, [2015] AC at 
1248.  
62Davies, above n 3 at 198, discussing judgment in Credit Bank Lyonnais NV v Export 
Credits Guarantee Department, [2000] AC 486 (HL). 
63ibid at 220. 
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fraud or copyright infringement, the risk is that accessories to torts commonly viewed as working 
more fundamental harms—battery, for example—will be under-deterred and their victims under-
acknowledged and under-compensated outside the ambit of criminal law and its administration.64 
ii.  Equity        
 A crucial starting point is the nature of duties characterized as ‘fiduciary’. Famously, 
Millett L.J. said in Bristol & West Building Society v. Mothew that ‘[t]he expression “fiduciary 
duty” is properly confined to those duties which are peculiar to fiduciaries and the breach of 
which attracts legal consequences differing from those consequent upon the breach of other 
duties’.65 As becomes evident in Section IV, US terminology is not as sparing in using the term 
‘fiduciary’.66 In particular, corporate directors who breach their duties of care, even in the 
absence of a conflicting interest, are viewed as having breached a fiduciary duty. But for present 
purposes this may not matter much because had US law confined the label of ‘fiduciary’ breach 
to directors’ loyalty-related transgressions, directors’ breaches of the duty of care would (one 
thinks) have been litigated as torts, and claims against accessories would have proceeded within 
the generalized framework elaborated in Section II.67 
 Overall, in equity, accessory liability developed somewhat haltingly, from a long-lived 
legacy of restrictive definition toward relatively greater clarity and coherence.68 In particular, the 
                                                 
64Davies, above n 3 at 220 (criticizing implication that an expectation of loyalty from a 
fiduciary should rank higher than ‘the right to bodily integrity and freedom’). 
65Bristol & West Building Society v.Mothew, [1998] Ch 1 (CA) 16, [1997] 2WLR 436, 
448.  
66But some bodies of doctrine do not characterize as ‘fiduciary’ all duties that an actor 
might owe. Agency law, for example, differentiates an agent’s duties of performance from duties 
of loyalty. See Restatement (Third) of Agency, Topic 1 (Agent’s Duties to Principal). 
67 English law on the applicable framework is not clear. See Davies, above n 3 at 100.  
68Davies, above n 3 at 88. For a detailed account, see EP Ellinger, E Lomnicka & CVM 
Hare, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law, 5th edn, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) ch. 7, 
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definition of the primary wrong requisite for accessory liability in connection with breach of 
fiduciary duty expanded. Nonetheless, the constitutive elements of accessory culpability may 
retain an overhang of precedent requiring not only that an accessory have acted dishonestly but 
that the accessory have been self-aware of acting dishonestly, a requisite focused on a 
defendant’s conscience that owes much to criminal law.69  
 One legacy of the nineteenth-century precedent, Barnes v. Addy,70 was a two-limbed 
specification of accessory conduct derived from a case in which the accessory defendants acted 
as a solicitors for an initial trustee and his (bankrupt) successor, who misappropriated trust 
property. The initial trustee’s solicitor advised him of the risk that the successor might 
misappropriate trust property, but the initial trustee thought this unlikely. The successor trustee’s 
solicitor, acting on his client’s instructions, prepared the deeds requisite for the transfer. As Lord 
Selborne formulated the bases for liability, non-trustees could be subject to liability stemming 
from a trustee’s breach when ‘they are found making themselves trustees de son tort’, or 
‘actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que 
trust’.71 Separately, a non-trustee’s receipt of  trust property may subject the receiver to liability 
in restitution.72 More generally, wrote Lord Selborne, ‘strangers are not to be made constructive 
                                                                                                                                                             
pt. 5. As applied to banks, regulation may have substantially overtaken the potential risk of 
accessory liability under English law; ‘a bank that has been used for the diversion of trust assets 
or as part of some other fraudulent or criminal scheme may well have other more pressing 
concerns’. ibid  at 289.   
69 Davies, above n 3 at 119. Whether dishonesty for civil law purposes should be defined 
differently than in criminal law is open to dispute. See Starglade Properties Ltd v. Nash [2010] 
EWCA Civ 1314 [42]-[44](Lord Leveson). 
70Barnes v.Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 (CA). On the longevity of the two-limbed 
doctrine and the cases preceding Barnes v. Addy, see WMC Gummow, Knowing assistance 
(2013) 87 Australian Law Journal 311-19. 
71Barnes v. Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 (CA) 251-252. 
72Unless the recipient has a defense, such as change of position.  
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trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal 
powers, transactions, perhaps of which a Court of Equity may disapprove... unless they assist 
with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees’.73 Thus, unless 
the accessory received trust property through the trustee’s breach of trust, this precedent limited 
accessory liability to instances of fraudulent and dishonest misconduct by trustees in which the 
accessory ‘actually’ participated.  
 As Paul Davies suggests, the narrowness with which Barnes v. Addy formulated  
requisites for accessory liability may reflect its time, in which trustees’ liability encompassed 
‘innocent incompetence’.74 Anachronistic though the comparison might seem, ‘innocent 
incompetence’ characterizes some breaches of directors’ duties under Delaware corporate law, as 
Section IV explains. Additionally, it’s worth noting that the facts of Barnes v. Addy are 
unpromising as a basis for liability under US law, based on the Restatement formulation. The 
solicitors lacked anything approaching actual knowledge that the successor trustee planned to 
misappropriate trust property. And how did the solicitors ‘encourage’ the successor trustee’s 
breach? To be sure, the breach was preceded by advice to the initial trustee from his solicitor and 
by drafting done by the successor trustee’s solicitor, but these actions fall far short of culpability.   
 Over one hundred years later (1995), the Privy Council broadened the scope of accessory 
liability by rejecting the requirement that the primary wrong constitute (as it did in Barnes v. 
Addy) dishonesty.75 In Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan,76 an insolvent travel company 
defaulted on its debt to an airline. The airline sued the company’s principal director and 
                                                 
73Barnes v. Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 (CA) 251-252. 
74Davies, above n 3 at 94.  
75For Australia, the scope of accessory liability retains the formulation in Barnes v Addy. 
See Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22 [161]. 
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shareholder. Delivered by Lord Nicholls, the judgment jettisoned the requirement that the 
trustee’s breach have been dishonest and fraudulent; what mattered was the accessory’s fault and 
its character, not the character of the trustee’s fault. Indeed, explained Lord Nicholls, ‘the case 
for liability of the dishonest [accessory] seems stronger when the trustee is innocent, because in 
such a case the [accessory] alone was dishonest and that was the cause of the subsequent 
misappropriation of trust property’.77 Put differently, were the accessory honest, unless the 
accessory made an honest mistake, most likely the breach of trust would not have occurred. To 
define ‘dishonesty’, Tan adopted an objective standard that expected an individual ‘to attain the 
standard which would be observed by an honest person placed in those circumstances’.78 An 
honest person—a legal construction, like the reasonable person in tort law79—has regard to 
known circumstances, which may dictate what course of action to take, including asking 
questions and possibly declining to become involved.80 Premised as it is on the accessory’s 
knowledge, liability under Tan appears to follow consistently with US doctrine, albeit in equity 
not tort.  
 Seven years later (2002), the force and clarity of Tan were undercut by the House of 
Lords in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley.81 Four of five judgments rejected Tan’s objective standard 
grounded in the accessory defendant’s knowledge for a more subjective and inward-looking test; 
as Lord Hutton wrote, ‘it would be less than just for the law to permit a finding that a defendant 
                                                                                                                                                             
76Royal Brunei Airlines SDN v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378. 
77Royal Rrunei Airlines SDN v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378, 385. 
78Royal Brunei Airlines SDN v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378, 390. 
79Of course, as legal standards, honesty and reasonableness make different demands on 
the actors subject to them. 
80Royal Brunei Airlines SDN v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378, 390-391.  
81Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164. And to some observers, Tan itself ‘left 
room for doubt and uncertainly as to  the precise test’ for dishonesty. Ellinger, above n 68 at 282.   
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had been “dishonest” in assisting a breach of trust where he knew of the facts which created the 
trust and its breach but had not been aware that what he was doing would be regarded by honest 
men as being dishonest.82 The accessory defendant in Twinsectra was a solicitor acting for a 
property entrepreneur. Acting on his client’s instructions, he paid over borrowed money to his 
client knowing that it would not be used to acquire property although the solicitor knew that the 
money had been received from the lender with an undertaking that it would be retained until 
applied to acquire property.83 Cross-examined at trial about his state of mind, the solicitor 
testified he ‘merely’ followed his client’s instructions and had no reason to disbelieve his client’s 
statement that the money would be used to buy property. But the client used the money for other 
purposes and failed to repay the loan. In the assessment of Lord Millett, the dissenter, the 
solicitor was unaware of no relevant fact. Although he was not willfully blind to the facts, he did 
close his eyes to their implications, ‘that is to say the impropriety of putting the money at [his 
client’s] disposal’.84  
 As Lord Millett wrote extrajudicially, Twinsectra weakened the force of the law and thus 
of advice lawyers could give to their clients, premised as accessory liability was on a defendant’s 
own subjective appreciation of wrongfulness.85 In fairness to the majority, a standard of 
culpability geared solely to an accessory defendant’s knowledge catapults the court into a fraught 
body of English law defining ‘knowledge’, from which the majority sought to avert (as did Lord 
Nicholls in Tan). But the Twinsectra majority did not explain why the relevant standard should 
instead protect accessory defendants who—unlike the solicitor for the successor trustee in 
                                                 
82Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 174 (Lord Hutton)(emphasis added). 
83Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164, 168 (Lord Hoffman). 
84Twinsectra Ltd v. Yardley [2002] 2 AC 165, 203 (Lord Millett). 
85As reported above n 55. 
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Barnes v. Addy—know all relevant facts, fail to appreciate their consequences, and act to 
facilitate breach of fiduciary duty.  
 Two years later (2004), the Privy Council appears to have agreed with Lords Nicholls 
and Millett. In Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Hamilton,86 the principal directors of a 
company providing off-shore financial services facilitated the operation of a fraudulent 
investment scheme by transferring investors’ funds as directed by the scheme’s organizer into 
transactions with no apparent commercial purpose. And one director, fully aware of the nature of 
the organizer’s business and how it sourced liquid funds, came to know enough to suspect 
misappropriation but nonetheless authorized transfers of investors’ funds into accounts 
controlled by the organizer and his confederates. The Barlow Clowes judgment does not deal 
straightforwardly with Twinsectra and its implications. Instead, acknowledging ‘an element of 
ambiguity’ susceptible of being read to encompass the defendant’s subjective views of honesty, 
Barlow Clowes claims to clarify that what was required was ‘only that his knowledge of the 
transaction had to be such as to render his participation contrary to normally accepted standards 
of honest conduct’.87 Given the facts, it’s remarkable that the defendant’s argument had any 
prospect of success, for unlike the other accessory defendants in this sequence of cases, the 
accessory knew his client was engaged in major criminal misconduct via out-and-out 
misappropriation of investors’ money. 
      IV. Investment Bankers as Accessories  
 Although the general structure of accessory liability is well established in the United 
States, its application to categories of actors can be controversial, most recently among 
                                                 
86 Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Hamilton [2005] UKPC 37, [2006] 1WLR 1476 
87Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Hamilton, [2005] ULPC 37, [2006] 1WLR 1476, 
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investment banks and the lawyers who advise them. This section opens with a brief description 
of salient features of Delaware corporate law that shape liability in the M&A context. The 
section next reviews recent applications of accessory doctrine to investment bankers, focusing 
mostly on the best-developed and most recent case, and then explores implications of accessory 
liability in this setting.  
A.   Duties, Liabilities, and Roles 
 In contrast to the sparing definition of ‘fiduciary’ that typifies UK doctrine, Delaware law  
characterizes directors’ fiduciary duties as multi- faceted, consisting of a duty of loyalty (which 
incorporates a duty of good faith) and a duty of care.88 Cases fleshing out distinctive content for 
the duty of good faith cast it as a component of  the duty of loyalty that prohibits knowing or 
reckless conduct detrimental to the corporation’s interests.89 When directors initiate or consider 
engaging in an M&A transaction that would end the company’s separate existence or otherwise 
transfer control, the duties that directors owe to the target and its shareholders remain the 
fiduciary duties of loyalty (and good faith) and  care; but the object toward which the duties 
should be exercised narrows to obtaining the best deal reasonably available for the target’s 
shareholders.90 To fulfill their duties, target directors often retain an expert advisor to assist in 
estimating the company’s value relative to the price and other terms on which it might be sold.91 
                                                                                                                                                             
1481. 
88On the history of the duty of good faith as a component of the duty of loyalty, see AS 
Gold, ‘The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law’ (2009) 43 UC Davis Law Review 457. 
89ibid.  
90The intricacies of a sizable number of cases articulating the specifics are beyond the 
scope of this paper. Conventionally, though, target directors are said to owe Revlon duties, a 
label derived from Revlon Inc v Macandrews & Forbes Holdings Inc 506 A2d 173 (Del 1986), 
which made clear that the court’s review in this context is distinctively exacting. 




Investment banks that perform this advisory service often serve an additional agency role on 
behalf of the target by contacting prospective bidders, conducting an auction or otherwise 
attempting to elicit the best price, and executing the transaction.92 As Section II noted, some 
investment banks furnish only these services; others—typically larger banks—also furnish 
financing to enable purchasers to complete M&A deals, including those for which the same bank 
also serves as an advisor to the target company’s board.93 Providing financing for an acquisition 
generally commands much higher fees than advising the board of an acquisition target.   
 The Delaware corporation statute permits a company to include a provision in its 
charter—its ‘certificate of incorporation’—that exculpates directors from monetary liability 
stemming from breaches of duty, except for breaches of the duties of loyalty and good faith.94 
Thus, in a typical company, directors who breach their duties of care do not confront a risk of 
monetary liability, whether or not the breach occurs in the M&A context. The protection 
afforded by an exculpatory provision extends only to directors and not to officers or third-party 
providers of professional services, like investment banks. As discussed more fully below, the 
terms on which a target’s board retains an investment bank may attempt to address and mitigate 
liability risks for the bank, including those stemming from its provision of advisory services to a 
target and financing to a bidder linked by the same M&A deal. In general, Delaware cases do not 
give effect to provisions in engagement agreements that through general or unspecific terms 
purport to relieve the bank of liability.95  
                                                 
92Ibid at 1093-1095. 
93Bratton & Wachter, above n 54 at 24 (describing practice of ‘stapled financing’ and 
conflicts it engenders). 
94Del Code Ann tit 8, § 102(b)(7). 
95 Rural/Metro I, 88 A3d 54, 100-101 (Del Ch 2014). There is no clear English authority 
addressing the availability to an accessory of an exclusion clause that protects a primary 
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B. Accessory Doctrine Applied 
 The Delaware Supreme Court’s 2015 opinion in RBC Capital Markets LLC v. Jervis96 is 
a legal landmark for many reasons. To be sure, RBC Capital was not the first acknowledgment 
from a Delaware court that investment banks could be subject to accessory liability when the 
bank’s conflicting interests had a substantial connection to breaches of fiduciary duty by a 
target’s directors.97 The precedential gravity of RBC Capital stems in part from its procedural 
status. Unusually, the case ‘went the distance’ through a full trial before the Court of Chancery 
and two lengthy opinions from that court to an appeal decided by the Delaware Supreme Court.98 
Although the bank as appellant expressly made no arguments on appeal requiring review of any 
finding of fact, the Supreme Court examined the record in its entirely, documenting its effort in 
an opinion dominated as much by a detailed factual narrative as by legal analysis. This 
underscores the settled and straightforward basics of this accessory tort under Delaware law. It 
also underscores the character and degree of the bank’s departures from legally tolerable 
                                                                                                                                                             
wrongdoer. For discussion of exclusion clauses when the primary wrong is a breach of contract, 
see Davies, above n 3 at 145. 
96RBC Capital LLC v Jervis, 129 A3d 816 (Del 2015). 
97Noteworthy predecessors are In re El Paso Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 41 A3d 432 
(Del Ch 2012)(directors relied on advice from M&A advisor that owned 19% equity interest in 
prospective buyer; bank’s team led by banker with large personal shareholding in buyer); In re 
Del Monte Co. Shareholder Litigation, 25 A3d 813 (Del Ch 2011)(M&A advisor to target 
surreptitiously assisted potential bidders in structuring joint bid, among other instances of 
problematic conduct). An earlier precedent questioned the general propriety of ‘stapled 
financing’, that is, acquisition financing offered by target’s M&A advisor to prospective bidders. 
See In re Toys “R” Us Shareholder Litigation, 877 A2d 975 (Del Ch 2005). Still earlier 
authority recognized a claim of accessory liability against an advisor retained by a management 
group taking a company private. See In re Shoe-Town Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 1990 WL 
13475 at * 7-8 (Del Ch Feb 12 1990). 
98For this terminology, see Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 2016 WL 402540 at *17 
(Del Ch Feb 2, 2016)(discussing In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A2d 693 





 Engaged as its M&A advisor by the board of a long-time client, Rural/Metro Corp., the 
bank structured the sale process on an unusual two-track basis with the objective—not initially 
disclosed to its client—of enabling the bank to obtain a role in financing the sale and acquisition 
of another company. That this company was a direct competitor of Rural/Metro complicated the 
sale process and limited the number of bidders. The bank also, in the court’s characterization, 
engaged in ‘illicit manipulation’ of the directors’ deliberative process by altering its valuation 
analyses to cast a more favorable light on the bid favored by the bank. As a consequence, 
Rural/Metro sold for substantially less than it was worth, injuring its shareholders;99 
Rural/Metro’s directors breached their fiduciary duties of care through the underpriced sale, their 
acquiescence in a flawed process, plus false statements made to Rural’s shareholders concerning 
the deal.      
 RBC Capital articulates the elements of accessory liability in familiar terms. Focusing in 
particular on the requirement that the accessory knowingly participate in the primary breach, the 
court endorsed the Court of Chancery’s statement that accessory liability requires the accessory 
to have acted with scienter, that is with ‘an illicit state of mind’, meaning with ‘actual or 
constructive knowledge that their conduct was improper’.100 One might wonder how close the 
scienter standard comes to Twinsectra’s subjective requirement that an accessory proceed with 
self-awareness of dishonesty, beyond knowledge that its conduct is dishonest. The ‘manifest 
                                                 
99Delaware characterizes such injuries as individual to shareholders, not injuries to the 
company that give rise to claims that must be brought in derivative suits. 
100RBC Capital LLC v. Jervis, 129 A3d 816, 862, quoting Wood v. Baum, 953 A2d 136, 
141 (Del 2008)(Del 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although this language posits 
constructive knowledge as alternative to actual knowledge, the scienter requirement seems to 
obviate its significance. 
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intentionality’ of the bank’s conduct, according to RBC Capital, ‘is demonstrative of the 
advisor’s knowledge of the reality that the Board was proceeding on the basis of fragmentary and 
misleading information.’101 This formulation turns on an objective assessment of whether an 
accessory acted with knowledge of the primary wrong, not the more subjective focus required by 
Twinsectra. 
C. Further Implications       
 RBC Capital emphasizes the bank’s authorship of breaches of duty committed by the 
target’s directors: the bank ‘knowingly induced’ the breaches ‘by exploiting its own conflicted 
interests to the detriment of Rural and by creating an informational vacuum’.102 To be sure, the 
directors failed to exercise adequate oversight over the bank once they knew that it had 
entanglements with prospective bidders, but the bank’s own conduct initiated the cascade of 
woes that followed.103 Given its emphasis on damning factual specifics, RBC Capital leaves 
open whether liability follows when an advisor is subject to an undisclosed conflict and aware of 
breaches of the duty of care by directors, but overall the advisor’s conduct is less problematic.104 
 A separate question is how best to characterize the relationship between a target 
corporation (or its directors) and an investment bank retained to act as an M&A advisor. To the 
                                                 
101RBC Capital LLC v Jervis, 129 A3d 816, 863 (Del 2015). 
102RBC Capital LLC v. Jervis, 129 A3d 816, 862 (Del 2015). 
103This calls to mind the argument in Tan that the justification for accessory liability is 
even stronger when the primary wrongdoer is only hapless or careless. 
104Recent examples lack the full factual development of RBC Capital. See Singh v 
Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, at *2 n.7 (Del 2016)(characterizing bank’s conduct in RBC Capital   
as duping board into breach of duty of care for bank’s own motives; bank in instant case, in 
contrast, delayed its disclosure of prior pitch of advisory client to acquirer until merger 
agreement signed); In re TIBCO Software Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 2015 WL 6155894 (Del 
Ch Oct 20, 2015)(denying motion to dismiss; not wanting to jeopardize $47.4 million fee, 
advisor concealed from target board information that shares had been miscounted and that 
acquiror had relied on miscount in calculating consideration, resulting in bargain price for 
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extent that the relationship—founded as it is in an engagement agreement—is contractual105, the 
bank’s obligations might be delimited by agreement. RBC Capital explicitly rejected the Court of 
Chancery’s description of these relationships that positions M&A advisors as ‘gatekeepers’.106 
This characterization, unmoored by any articulation of duty, lacks clarity and coherence with tort 
doctrine more generally. Additionally, RBC Capital does not explicitly characterize the 
relationship between target directors and their M&A advisor as fiduciary.107 Instead, discussing 
the informational asymmetries that typify contracting between a bank and its client, the court 
emphasized the significance of disclosure to ‘level the field’ but also concluded with an 
unqualified assertion of an obligation ‘not to act in a manner that is contrary to the interests of 
the board of directors ....’108 This links the bank’s liability back to basic tort doctrine by stressing 
the categorical obligation to refrain from intentionally wrongful conduct. 
 Finally, RBC Capital ‘went the distance’ in an additional and unusual respect. The bank, 
as the sole defendant not to settle prior to trial, confronted a judgment for $91,323,554.61, or  
$4.17/share, representing damages suffered by Rural’s former shareholders. Relying on the 
Delaware statute governing contribution among tortfeasors109, the bank sought a credit against 
the judgment for settlement amounts paid by other defendants—$5 million by another bank that 
served in a secondary role, and $6.6 million by two conflicted directors who played significant 
roles in the sale process. Resolving questions of first impression, the Court of Chancery 
apportioned responsibility as among the bank and the other defendants. To do so required 
                                                                                                                                                             
acquiror). 
105See Bratton & Wachter, above n 54 at 7-8. 
106 Rural/Metro I, 88 A3d 54, 88 (Del Ch 2014).  
107On justifications for so characterizing M&A advisors, see Tuch, above n 91. 
108RBC Capital LLC v. Jervis, 129 A3d 816, (Del 2015) 865 n 191. 
109Delaware Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Del Code tit 10 §§ 6301-08.  
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assessing the character of the bank’s tort.  
 Although Delaware’s contribution statute does not explicitly bar contribution on behalf of 
intentional tortfeasors, the court considered at length the type of intentional tort that accessory 
liability represents. The bank knowingly participated in (and to a considerable extent induced) 
the directors’ breaches of duty, but its conduct was not criminal and was not intended to cause 
physical injury.110 Its intentional tort thus lacked the moral gravity that should exclude the 
possibility of contribution. On the other hand, to the extent the bank misled its client’s directors, 
it came to equity with unclean hands in its quest for contribution; to permit contribution (here in 
the form of settlement credit) would enable the bank  to ‘take[] advantage of the targets of its 
own misconduct.’111 Calculating contribution in this light, the court exercised its discretion to 
reduce the judgment against the bank to $75.8 million, having allocated some measure of fault to 
two directors who had distinct personal interests in the sale.  
V.      Conclusion 
 These contrasts help make the case for accessory liability as a worthy subject for further 
academic scrutiny. The comparative account in this paper also demonstrates the significance of 
taxonomic placement for substantive doctrine. The emphasis in US law on objective measures 
for  accessory culpability fits well with tort law’s general focus on legally-constructed reasonable 
persons, not the inward-looking reflections of individual actors. As Justice Holmes wrote: ‘The 
law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education which 
make the internal character of a given act so different in different men. It does not attempt to see 
                                                 
110In re Rural/Metro Stockholders Litigation, 102 A3d 205, 237 (Del Ch 2014), affd sub 
nom RBC Capital LLC v. Jervis, 129 A3d 816 (Del 2015)(‘Rural/ Metro II’). 
111Rural/Metro II, 102 A3d 205, 239. Thus, albeit the tortious character of the bank’s 
wrong, equitable doctrine applied. 
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men as God sees them ….’112 The paper’s comparative account also highlights the interstitial 
function that accessory liability can serve, whether characterized as a tort or an equitable wrong. 
The prospect of accessory liability may deter conduct by actors situated to withhold facilitation 
necessary to the wrongdoing of others, especially when other constraints on problematic conduct 
are weak, as well as serving as an additional source of recovery for victims of wrongdoing. The 
comparative account also illustrates the independent character of accessory liability, which 
rationalizes outcomes—as in Tan and RBC Capital—in which an accessory’s culpability differs 
from that of the primary wrongdoer.     
 
    
                                                 
112 OW Holmes Jnr, The Common Law (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1881) 108. 
